VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AS A NEW CATEGORY OF
UNPROTECTED SPEECH

Kelly Guglielmi

In the '60s and '70s, the nation found itself in
the middle of a revolution. Music was changing,
equality began to become a reality and sex became an anthem for a generation breaking free of
the Leave it to Beaver stereotypes. It was during this
revolution that the Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence began to evolve largely in response to the thousands of individuals speaking
out against the Vietnam War. This generation
brought about vast changes in society, which included an increasing acceptance of hard-core pornography.1
The Supreme Court did not follow the nation's
youth in embracing hard-core pornography. Although the Supreme Court held in Stanley v. Georgia2 that a state could not ban the in-home possession of obscenity, 3 in Miller v. California4 it
reaffirmed its previous holdings that obscenity
was not protected by the First Amendment. 5
About ten years later, in New York v. Ferber,6 the
Court furthered the state's ability to regulate sexI See United States v. Stevens, 29 F. Supp. 2d 592, 595 n.4
(D. Alaska 1998), vacated by 197 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 1999).
2
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
3
Id. at 568.
4

413 U.S. 15 (1973).

5
7

Id. at 36-37.
458 U.S. 747 (1982), affd, 57 N.Y.2d 256 (1982).
Id. at 757.

8

Id. at 756.

6

9 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
10 Id. at 111.
11 See id. at 110; see also FINAL REPORT OF THE ATr'Y GEN.'S
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 406, 410 (1986) [hereinafter
AI-r'v GEN.'s COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY] (concluding
that the Supreme Court's decision in Ferber forced the production of child pornography underground where it has become a "cottage industry").
12
S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7 (1996).
'3
See id.
14
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997,
Pub. L. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). In United States v. Kimbrough,
the defense argued that the government was required to
show that each image purporting to be child pornography

ually explicit material when it upheld a state law
proscribing the distribution and production of
child pornography. 7 The Court granted states tremendous leeway in regulating child pornography,
which allows them the proper tools to protect the
nation's children from sexual abuse. 8 Later, in Osborne v. Ohio,9 the Court held that a statute banning the possession of child pornography was constitutional. 10

After the Supreme Court's decision in Ferber,
the child pornography industry was forced underground 1 and remained there until the Internet
provided pedophiles a new medium to trade their
pornographic pictures of children.' 2 In addition,
technological developments in computers have
enabled child pornography to be produced solely
by a computer.13 In response to this development,
Congress enacted the Child Pornography Prevention Act ("CPPA") of 1996.14 The CPPA created a
new definition of child pornography that incorporated pictures generated on a computer.' 5 Conactually depicted a minor. Although the defense was not victorious, Congress recognized that advances in technology will
make it almost impossible for prosecutors to convict individuals for possessing child pornography because they will not be
able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the image depicts an actual child. 69 F.3d 723, 733 (5th Cir. 1995).
15
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000). The CPPA defines child
pornography as:
[A]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film,
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where:
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the
use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual'depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or
modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted,
presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is
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gress found that these images can cause many of
the same harms to children as actual child pornography and that these images further the sex6
ual exploitation of children.'
Congress' actions created uproar among scholars arguing that virtual child pornography

7

is

protected speech.' The majority of courts, however, have disagreed, maintaining that Congress
has more power to regulate any form of child pornography because of the importance of protecting the nation's children from sexual abuse. '
The answer to whether virtual child pornography
is protected speech begins with the question:
What did the Supreme Court intend child pornography to include when it held child pornography was not protected by the First Amendment?
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in United States v. Hilton2 0 stated that regulation of

sexually explicit material could be viewed on a
continuum when speaking in terms of legal protection. 2' At one end of the continuum is adult
pornography2 2 and at the other end is child pornography. Falling somewhere in between is virtual
child pornography. 23 The question is: To which
or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct.
Id. at § 2556(8).
16
See infra text accompanying note 139.
17
See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1098
n.1 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001). The
dissent divides computer-generated pornography into two
categories: virtual child pornography and computer-altered
child pornography. Virtual child pornography is defined as
an image that is 100% virtual whereas computer-altered
images use the face of an actual minor. The CPPA addresses
both issues, and therefore, this comment will refer to all
child pornography generated on a computer as virtual child
pornography. For clarification images that were made using
real children will be referred to as actual child pornography.
This distinction, however, is not meant to suggest that child
pornography created on a computer is a lesser form of child
pornography.
18 See, e.g., Debra D. Burke The Criminalizationof Virtual
Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 339, 461 (1997) [hereinafter Burke]; Gary Geating, Obscenity and Other UnprotectedSpeech: Free Speech Coalition v. Reno,

13

BERKELEY TECH.

L.J. 389, 395 (1998) [hereinafter Geat-

ing]; Brenda M. Simon, Child Pornography: United States v.
Hilton, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 385, 394 (1999) [hereinafter
Simon]; Samantha L. Friel, Porn by any Other Name: A Constitutional Alternative to Regulating "Victimless" Computer-Cenerated
Child Pornography,32 VAL. U. L. REV. 207, 229 (1997) [hereinafter Friel].
19 See, e.g., United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Carroll, 190 F.3d 290 (5th Cir.
1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999),
cert denied, 528 U.S. 844 (1999). But see, Free Speech Coalition,
198 F.3d at 1095 (holding that virtual child pornography is
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side does virtual child pornography fall closer?
Does it fall closer to the side of adult pornography
and thus gain more First Amendment protection?
Or, is it just another species of child pornography
to which the Supreme Court has already denied
protection? Perhaps, the answer is neither because virtual child pornography really is a new category of unprotected speech.
This comment will place virtual child pornography in its proper place on the continuum by establishing that it is a new category of unprotected
speech. Specifically, this comment will conclude
that virtual child pornography should be placed
between obscenity and real child pornography.
Part I of this comment will examine the development of case law pertaining to the categories of
sexually explicit material that are not protected by
the First Amendment. It also will establish a methodology for examining speech under the categorical approach. Particularly, this comment will illustrate the differences between child pornography
and obscenity in an attempt to show that virtual
child pornography must lie somewhere between
both of these unprotected forms of speech in
protected speech).
21
167 F.3d 61.
21
Id. at 70.
22
This comment distinguishes between adult pornography, including "hard-core" pornography, and obscenity for
purposes of clarity. Specifically, this comment will refer to
adult pornography only when discussing sexually explicit material portraying adults that is protected by the First Amendment. Obscenity, on the other hand, will refer to sexually explicit material that is unprotected by the free speech clause.
Obscenity is defined in Part L.B of this comment. Obscenity's
place on the continuum is discussed in Part I.D.
23
The third edition of the American Heritage Dictionary
defines a continuum as "a continuous extent or whole, no
part of which can be distinguished from neighboring parts

except by arbitrary division."

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY

189-90 (3d ed. 1994). The idea of a continuum of sexually
explicit material can be seen from varying angles. This comment, however, will focus on the legal protection given to
certain types of sexually explicit speech and will rely on the
arbitrary boundaries between the varying types of speech.
The idea of a continuum also is a sound approach for analyzing sexually explicit material because it stresses the existence of arbitrary boundaries. For example, the continuum
could be used to illustrate the ambiguity and difficulty in
placing sexually explicit material into a specific category, i.e.
adult pornography versus obscenity. The fact that a type of
material reasonably may be concluded to be in two places on
the continuum does not significantly affect the continuum's
value. For example, the fact that child pornography also may
be obscene does not affect the outcome of this comment in
terms of where virtual child pornography should be placed
on the continuum.
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terms of legal protection. Part I also will lay out
Congress' findings relating to virtual child pornography and the CPPA's definition of child pornography.
Part II will illustrate the problems with applying
the Supreme Court's present definition of child
pornography to virtual child pornography, thus
concluding virtual child pornography is its own
category of speech. Part III will show that virtual
child pornography adds little value to the free expression of ideas. Part IV then examines the common governmental interests in prohibiting both
actual and virtual child pornography in order to
show that laws regulating virtual child pornography rely on compelling governmental interests.
Part V will match the CPPA's definition of child
pornography to the definition the Supreme Court
created in Ferberand Osborne as a means to discern
what speech will be viewed as virtual child pornography. Finally, Part V, in establishing the limits of
this new category of speech, refutes any possible
overbreadth arguments against the CPPA by focusing on how courts have interpreted the statute
and the intent of Congress.
I.

THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO
DEFINING UNPROTECTED SEXUALLY
EXPLICIT MATERIAL

A.

Overview of the Categorical Approach to
the First Amendment

Under the categorical approach to the First
Amendment, government may regulate freely certain "categories" of speech because they are not
protected by the First Amendment. 24 Among
these forms of speech are: (1) speech that is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action; 25 (2)

obscenity; 2 6 (3)

defamation; 2 7

24
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942) ("There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional

problem."); see also Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The
MisleadingNature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context
in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1227
(1984) [hereinafter Faber & Nowak].
25
See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573; Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969).

(4) false or misleading commercial speech; 28 and
(5) child pornography. 29 The Supreme Court in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire° stated that "such ut-

terances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."3 1 The key phrases in Chaplinsky with respect to the categorical approach are
"slight social value" and "clearly outweighed by
the social interest. ' 32 If the state's interest in proscribing the speech "clearly outweighs" the
speech's value, the speech may be deemed a category of speech which does not deserve First
Amendment protection.

Obscenity as a Category of Unprotected
Speech

B.

In Roth v. United States,3 4 the Supreme Court

held that the government could regulate the dis35
tribution and production of obscene material.
In terms of the categorical approach, the Court
found that "implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance." 36 In light
of obscenity's low social value and the state's interest in preserving a moral society, the Court
concluded that obscenity was not protected category of speech under the First Amendment.3 7 In
Miller, the Court established a definition for obscenity. Miller defined obscenity as material that
when taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interests; portrays sexual conduct as defined by the
law in a patently offensive way; and lacks serious
38
literary, artistic, political and scientific value.
The Court also held that, with the exception of
the last requirement, the test for obscenity is
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980).
29
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. See generally Farber & Nowak,
supra note 24, at 1228 (summarizing the current state of the
categorical approach).
30

315 U.S. 568.

31
32

Id. at 572.
Id.

33
34

Id.

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Miller,
413 U.S. at 23; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54

35

Id. at 484.

36

(1973).

37
38

Id.
Id. at 485.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.

26

27

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y.

33

345 U.S. 476.
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viewed from the standpoint of the average person
applying contemporary community standards. 39
In other words, material that is obscene in a small
town in Illinois may not be obscene in New York
City.
Although the Supreme Court granted state legislatures the ability to regulate obscenity, the
Court rejected the possibility of an outright ban
on obscenity in Stanley.40 In Stanley, the Court
struck down a Georgia statute that banned the
possession of obscene material. 4' The Georgia

statute, which banned the possession of obscenity,
unconstitutionally infringed on the right to privacy. 42 The Court held that although a legislature
could regulate the production and distribution of
obscene material, a ban on its possession infringed on a right "so fundamental to our scheme
of individual liberty" that the Court could not justify the statute as a proper exercise of governmental power. 4 3 In other words, paternalistic reasons
for regulating obscenity could not justify a state
entering private homes to control a person's
thoughts.

C.

44

Child Pornography and Establishing
Categorical Methodology

Mass production of child pornography did not
emerge until the early 1970s when technological
advances in photography enabled pornographic
images to be produced at little cost. 45 In Ferber,

the Supreme Court revisited the categorical approach when it held that child pornography is not
protected by the First Amendment. In Ferber, the
Court upheld a New York statute prohibiting individuals from distributing material depicting children under the age of 16 performing sexual
acts. 46 According to the Court, child pornography, like obscenity, was not protected by the First
Amendment; therefore, a state could regulate the
39
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production and distribution of child pornography.47 Further, states are given greater flexibility

to protect children by regulating the porno48
graphic images of children.

The categorical methodology that the Supreme
Court relied on required the Court to examine
child pornography's social value and the governmental interests in regulating child pornography.
First, with respect to social value, the Court concluded that the value of live performances and
photographs of children engaged in sexual activ' 49
ity is "exceedingly modest' if not de minimus."
Further, the Court found that there would be few,
if any, situations in which a literary, scientific or
educational reason would depend upon a sexually
50
explicit picture of a child.

The Court noted several key governmental interests that entitle the states "to greater leeway in
the regulation of pornographic depictions of children."5 ' The Court found that the state has a
compelling interest in "safeguarding the physical
52
and psychological well-being" of its children.
Additionally, the Court noted that it would not
second guess the legislature's conclusion that
prohibiting the distribution and production of
child pornography would reduce the sexual abuse
of children. 53 Further, the Court stated that the
distribution of child pornography is "intrinsically
related to the sexual abuse of children" because
(1) the material permanently records the victim's
abuse and (2) the production of child pornography depends upon its distribution. 54 In other
words, the advertising and selling of child pornography provides an economic motive for the pro55
duction of child pornography.
After outlining the governmental interests and
concluding that child pornography is of low social
value, the Court noted that child pornography, as
a category of unprotected speech, is consistent

40

Id.
394 U.S. at 568.

11, at 130-81, 341-84).
46 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765. The New York statute at issue in

41
42

Id.
See id.

Ferberspecifically addressed individuals who distributed pornographic pictures of children in order to promote live sexual performances of children. Id.

Id.
See id. at 565 (denying that states have the ability to
control the "moral content of a person's thoughts"). The
Court's holding in Stanley has been narrowed significantly in
passing years. E.g., ParisAdult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 66-67 (refusing to extend Stanley's privacy protection beyond the
•43,
44

home).
45

47

Id.

48

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

49
50
51
52

Stevens, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (citing

REPORT OF THF

53

136-43 (1970)
PORNOGRAPHY, supra note

54
55

COMMISSION ON OBSCENrrY AND PORNOGRAPHY

and ATr'y

GEN.'S COMMISSION ON

at
at
at
at
at

756.
762.
762-63.
756.
756-57.
at 757.
at 759.
at 761.
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with its prior case law. 5 6 The Court mainly relied
on the principles by which a category of speech is
denied First Amendment protection. 57 To reiterate, a category of speech is unprotected by the
First Amendment if the governmental interest
outweighs the value of the speech that the govern58
ment is attempting to regulate.
Upon holding child pornography was unprotected speech, the Ferber Court sought to limit the
scope of child pornography. Although child pornography and obscenity appear to be analogous,
the Court explicitly rejected the test laid out in
Miller, finding that the Miller test was ineffective
when examining child pornography. 59 Understanding the Court's rejection of Miller requires a
two-part analysis. First, the Court in Ferber did not
rely on. the paternalistic interest in regulating
child pornography. 60 Second, the Court noted
the main governmental interest in regulating
child pornography is to protect the child victim. 6 1
Specifically, the Court found fault with Miller's
requirement that the work "appeal to the prurient
interest of the average person[,]" and its exemption for works with literary, artistic, scientific or
political value. 62 For instance, the effect child pornography has on the average person is immaterial
when compared to the psychological and physical
harm inflicted upon the young victim. 63 Likewise,
the fact that the work may have literary, artistic,
political or scientific value also is irrelevant because the child already has been abused. 64 Miller's
main fault is that its application to child pornography does not ensure that children will not be
abused. Instead, the Miller standard as applied to
child pornography would allow some children to
be abused if the picture appealed to the average
56

Id. at 763.

Id. at 763-64.
Id.
Id. at 761. See also Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
Id. The Supreme Court's decisions holding that obscenity is not protected speech focuses mainly on the state's
interest in preserving a moral society. This interest is mainly
paternalistic. In fact, this is one of the reasons the Court
struck down the statute in Stanley. The paternalistic interests
of the state cannot invade a person's home. Stanley, 394 U.S.
at 565.
61 Ferber,458 U.S. at 756-62. Specifically, the Court in Ferber found that: (1) states have a compelling interest in
protecting the physical and psychological well-being of its
children; (2) the distribution of child pornography is "intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children"; (3) the distribution of such material is an "economic motive" for producing child pornography; and (4) there is little value in child
pornography. Id.
57
58
59
60

person's prurient interests, or if the picture possessed some literary, artistic, scientific or political
value.
Nevertheless, the Ferber Court used the Miller
standard as a framework for defining the scope of
its decision. 65 It eliminated the prong in Miller requiring a finding that the work appeals to the prurient interests of the average person; therefore,
there is no community standard to be applied to
child pornography. 66 Also, it is not necessary to
consider whether the work, as a whole, is patently
offensive. 67 The only remaining aspect of the
Miller standard that the Court applied to child
pornography was whether the work portrays sexual conduct as defined by the applicable law.68
Addressing the portrayal of sexual conduct issue, the Court also limited the scope of material
encompassed in the unprotected category of child
pornography. First, the Court in Ferber held that
the statute must limit its reach to "works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a
specified stage."6 9 Also, the Court noted that "the
distribution of descriptions or other depictions of
sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do
not involve live performance or photographic or
other visual reproduction of live performances"
remain under the First Amendment's protection. 70 Finally, the Court noted that sexual conduct also includes a lewd exhibition of a child's
71
genitals.
The Supreme Court's method for establishing
child pornography as unprotected speech consisted of three steps. First, the court addressed
child pornography's low social value. 7v2 Next, the
Court distilled the governmental interests in regulating child pornography and compared those in62
63

Id. at 761. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
See id,

Id.
Id. at 764.
66
Id.
67
Id. The Court specifically does not give an explanation
as to why it eliminated these elements of the Miller standard.
Arguably the reason is that the Court found these requirements irrelevant when dealing with child pornography. As
the Court stated previously, the harm to the child is done
regardless of the works value. Id. at 761.
64
65

Id. at 765.
Id. at 764 (emphasis in original).
70
Id. at 764-65. As the Court defined the term "live performance" in Ferber, only live or visual depictions were prohibited under the New York statute. Id.
71
Id. at 773.
72 See id. at 762.
68

69
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terests to child pornography's low social value. 73
Finally, the Court limited the material that constituted child pornography.7 4 This three-step analysis determined that child pornography, as defined
in Ferber, was not protected under the free speech
clause.
Osborne stripped child pornography of another
constitutional right: the right to privacy. The
Court's holding in Osborne expanded the state's
ability to regulate child pornography in several
ways. 7 5 First, with respect to the definition of child
pornography, Osborne reaffirmed part of Ferber,
which stated that a lewd exhibition of a child's
genitals is not protected speech. 76 Although the

Court recognized that a mere picture of naked
child is protected speech, it accepted the Ohio
Supreme Court's reading of the Ohio statute as a
constitutional

interpretation.7

7

The

Ohio

Su-

preme Court had concluded that the Ohio statute
properly could prohibit not only the possession of
lewd depictions of a child's genitals but also pictures with a graphic focus on the genitals.

78

Ac-

cording to this conclusion, it is constitutional to
regulate naked pictures of children even if the
children are not engaged in sexual "conduct."
In Osborne, the Court found prior law dealing
with obscenity inadequate. 79 The Court held that
unlike obscenity, a state could ban completely the
possession of child pornography.8 0 Contrary to
the defendant's belief that Stanley required the
Court to strike down the statute, the Court distinguished Stanley because the governmental interests in proscribing child pornography were not
simply paternalistic in nature. 8 ' In Stanley, the
Court held that Georgia's only aim in regulating
the in-home possession of obscenity was to control
a person's thought.8 2 In contrast, the Court in Os73

See id. at 756-63.

See id. at 765-73.
75
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 106. The statute in Osborne regulated the possession of child pornography, but did not apply
if the individual possessing the material was the child's parent or ward, or if the individual possessing the material knew
that the parent, guardian or custodian consented to the child
posing nude. Also, if the material was "for a bona fide artistic,
medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose..."-provided it was viewed
by "a physician, psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher,
person pursuing bona fide studies or research, librarian, clergyman, prosecutor, judge, or other person having a proper
interest in the material or performance"-the statute did not
apply. Id.
76
Id. at 114.
77
Id. at 113-14.
74
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borne found Ohio's reasons for regulating the possession of child pornography were aimed mainly
at decreasing the exploitive use of children.

3

In

fact, the Court stated that there may even be compelling reasons to prohibit the possession of obscenity8 4 Nonetheless, the Court found it reasonable for a state to ban the possession of child
pornography in hopes of eliminating the market
for child pornography and eventually its produc85
tion.
Osborne also expanded the governmental interests in regulating child pornography. As mentioned previously, the Court acknowledged that
states may target the possession of child pornography as a means to stop its production. 86 A total
ban on the possession of child pornography was
necessary because, as the Court noted, the existence of the underground market has made laws
restricting the production of child pornography
hard, if not impossible, to enforce.8 7 The same

holds true for laws regulating the distribution of
child pornography. Whereas laws eliminating production are largely preventative, laws addressing
the distribution of child pornography mainly exist
to ease the psychological burden on the victims
who must accept that their image may circulate
for many years.88
Another compelling governmental interest recognized in Osborne dealt directly with the possession of child pornography. The Court found that
pedophiles sometimes use child pornography to
seduce other children.8 9 Pictures of children performing sexual acts often are used by pedophiles
to entice children who are reluctant to participate
in the activity. 90 This was important to the Court's
analysis because a law stopping the possession of
child pornography would decrease the ability of
78

Id. at 113.

See id. at 108.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 109.
82
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-66.
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109.
83
Id. at 110.
84
85
Id. at 109-10.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 110.
88 See id.; accord Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that
government has an interest in stopping the distribution of
child pornography because the material is a permanent record of the molestation)..
89 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
90 Id. at 11 n.7 (citing A-rr'' GEN.'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 11, at 649).
79

80
81
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pedophiles to abuse children. 9' Without access to
child pornography, pedophiles would have a
harder time coaxing a child into performing sex92
ual acts.

D.

Placing Obscenity and Child Pornography
on the Continuum

Although child pornography and obscenity are
both forms of sexually explicit material, the two
forms of speech are very different. The state's interest in proscribing child pornography dwarfs
the state's paternalistic reasons for regulating obscenity. 9 3 Also, a state may regulate child pornography more heavily than it may regulate obscenity. 9 4 If obscenity and child pornography are
placed on the continuum of sexually explicit ma95
terial, obscenity would be placed in the middle
with adult pornography and child pornography at
the two extremes. 96 Lastly, obscenity is placed in
between because it deserves some protection
under the First Amendment because the government cannot infringe on the individual's right to
privacy simply because they view obscene material. The question as to where virtual child pornography fits on the continuum now becomes
91

Id. at 109-10.
The Supreme Court also requires a state to include a
scienter element in its child pornography laws. Ferber, 458
U.S. at 765; see also Osborne, 495 U.S. at 114 (holding that
recklessness is an appropriate scienter with respect to viewers
and possessors of child pornography); United States v. XCitement Video, 573 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (holding that the scienter of knowing applied to the whole statute). Although
some critics rely on the holding in X-Citement Video to strike
down the CPPA, their arguments do not affect this comment's contention that virtual child pornography is not protected speech. Friel, supra note 18, at 220; see also Free Speech
Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1093; Geating, supra note 18, at 402-03.
Furthermore, these arguments are flawed because they misread X-Citement Video as requiring the scienter of knowledge.
The Court, however, allowed the government to prove that
the individual recklessly viewed or possessed child pornography. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 114. See generally Chad R. Fears,
Note, Shifting the Paradigm in Child Pornography Criminalization: United States v. Maxwell, 1998 BYU L. REv. 835 (1998)
(arguing recklessness is an appropriate mens rea for child
pornography crimes.).
93
See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (differentiating Ohio's law
banning the possession of child pornography from Stanley because protecting the victims of child pornography is more
compelling than the state's paternalistic reasons for regulating obscenity).
94 Id. at 111 (holding a state may prohibit the possession
of child pornography); see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756 (stating
that states are allowed more flexibility when regulating child
pornography).
95
Placing obscenity in the middle of the continuum
92

more difficult. Does virtual child pornography lie
between adult pornography and obscenity, or between obscenity and real child pornography? This
distinction is important because if virtual child
pornography is more like obscenity, Congress
could not ban its possession.
E.

The Child Pornography Prevention Act

Congress enacted the CPPA largely in response
to the technological advances, which occurred in
the late twentieth century.9 7 Congress found that
the new technology has made computer-generated child pornography" "virtually indistinguishable" from real child pornography. 99 Subsequent
to that finding, Congress concluded that computer-generated child pornography has many of
the same effects on children as does child pornography that uses actual children.' 0 For instance,
virtual child pornography (like actual child pornography) can be used by pedophiles to seduce
young children because a child may not be able to
distinguish between a real child and a computergenerated child. 10' Also, Congress found that
technology has enabled producers of child pornography to alter innocent pictures of childoes not mean that obscenity is located at the exact center. It
simply means that obscenity is in between the two extremes.
How close obscenity falls to the center line is not yet clear.
Arguably, it falls closer to adult pornography than child pornography because it has some protection under the First
Amendment. The exact placement of obscenity, however, is
not important for this comment.
96
Adult pornography is placed at one end because in enjoys the Constitution's full protection. In contrast, child pornography lacks any constitutional protection, and therefore,
it is placed at the other end of the continuum.
97
S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7.
98
The CPPA did not define computer-generated child
pornography separate from its definition of child pornography. See supra note 15 and accompanying text, quoting the
definition of child pornography.
99 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252-2256 (1994); see also Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 121, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
100
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009-26 (1996).
101 S. REP. No. 104-358, at 2. Congress also found that
virtual child pornography: (1) whets the sexual appetite of
child molesters and pedophiles; and (2) "creates an unwholesome environment which affects the psychological, mental
and emotional development of children and undermines the
efforts of parents and families to encourage the sound
mental, moral, and emotional development of children." Id.
These interests are largely paternalistic in nature and thus
ancillary to the primary reason the government is concerned
with regulating child pornography. Id.
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In addressing virtual child pornography, Congress also created a new definition of child pornography in the CPPA. The CPPA defines child
pornography as "any visual depiction, including
any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer
or computer-generated image or picture . .. of

sexually explicit conduct."' 3 The term "visual depiction" includes images that appear to be minors,10 4 and images that are "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in
such a way that conveys the impression" that the
material is of a minor. 10 5 This comment's primary
focus will be on the definition's inclusion of computer-generated images. 106

The CPPA also provides an affirmative defense
for individuals charged with selling, distributing
or receiving child pornography. 10

7

The affirma-

tive defense provides that individuals charged
with distributing, reproducing or selling child
pornography must prove that the images "w[ere]
produced using an actual person or persons," as
long as the persons were adults and that the mate08
rial was not promoted as child pornography.1
This defense does not apply when individuals are
charged with possession of child pornography
without the intent to sell the material.1 0 9 Congress
wanted to ensure that adult pornography would
not be caught in the statute's grasp" 0 while also
ensuring that individuals possessing material they
believe is child pornography would be punished.
Indeed, the main purpose of the affirmative defense is to strike down any overbreadth challenges
102

S.REP. No 104-358, at 15. For instance, an individual

could take a picture of a child model out of a clothing cata-

logue and make the child appear to be engaged in sexual
conduct.
103 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (8).
104 Id. at § 2256 (8)(a).
105
Id. at § 2256 (8)(d).
106 The "appears to be of a minor" provision actually
presents some overlap in Congress' definition. Hilton, 167
F.3d at 66. Essentially, any computer-generated picture of a

child would also classify as an image that "appears to be of a
minor." Id.
107
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (1996). Section 2252A(c)
states:
It shall be an affirmative defense ... that-(1) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual
person or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(2) each such person was an adult at the time the material was produced; and (3) the defendant did not adver-

tise, promote, present, describe, or distribute the material in such a manner as to convey the impression that it
is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.
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to the CPPA's "appears to be" provision.1 1 1 Otherwise, the provision inadvertently may illegalize
pornographic images of adults who look under
the age of 18.
II.

VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AS A
SEPARATE CATEGORY OF
UNPROTECTED SPEECH

At the time Ferberwas decided, its definition of
child pornography" 2 seemed suitable to address
the problems associated with child pornography.
Recent technological advances, however, have
made the exact definition of child pornography
hard to discern. This poses a problem in cases
where the prosecution cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the image depicts a real
child.' 1 Does Ferber require the government to
prove that the images depict real children? The
short answer is it all depends on whether Ferber is
read literally or not.
From a literal standpoint, some critics of the
CPPA have argued that the term "visually" only
applies to an actual child and that the definition's
inclusion of "live performance" lends itself to the
conclusion that only child pornography that portrays actual children is without First Amendment
protection.1 14 On the other hand, it also could be
argued that the Court only included the term
"live performance" in Ferberbecause the statute at
issue focused on the distribution of child pornography as a way to promote "live performances" of
sexual conduct.1 15 The latter argument recogId. at § 2252A(c).
108

Id. at 2252A(c).

109

Id. at 2252A(c)(3), 2252(d). Whereas both

§ 2252A(a)(4) and § 2252A(a)(5) address possession, the
sections distinguish individuals who intend to sell the mate-

rial from individuals who possess the material for personal
satisfaction.
ISo S. REP. No. 104-358, at 21.
111 Id.
112

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (categorizing child pornogra-

phy as "works that visually depict sexual conduct by children").
113
114

See supra text accompanying note 14.
Geating, supra note 18, at 395 (arguing Ferber's defini-

tion of child pornography only applies to images involving
real children).
115
One author defines child pornography as "photographs of actual children engaged in some sort of sexual activity either with adults or with other children." Friel, supra
note 18, at 217. This definition is flawed because it places too
much emphasis on the participation of two or more individuals. In fact, it bears a closer resemblance to the definition of
obscenity than child pornography. Material is obscene only if
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nizes a connection between the interests outlined

in Ferber and Congress' reasons for regulating virtual child pornography. The problem with the
second argument is that when defining child pornography, Ferber mainly relied on the abuse of
children that occurs when child pornography is
produced.' 16 The production of virtual child pornography, however, does not involve the direct
sexual abuse of children.
The problem of applying the Ferberdefinition to
virtual child pornography is further complicated
because, as the Ninth Circuit held in Free Speech
Coalition v. Reno,' 1 7 Ferberput forth the idea of using someone above the legal age who looks
younger, when a child's pornographic image is
needed for literary or artistic reasons.1 1 " Although
the Supreme Court found that it was immaterial
to the child depicted in the image whether the
image had any artistic, literary, scientific or political value, the same cannot be said for virtual child
pornography. Because computer-generated pornography is not created using sexually abused
children, the Supreme Court's reasoning for excluding speech that has literary, artistic, scientific
or political value does not apply.1 1 9 Although applying Ferber's definition of child pornography to
virtual child pornography is difficult and requires
too much guesswork, this does not lead to the
conclusion that virtual child pornography does
not fit into the First Amendment; it simply means
that virtual child pornography does not fit into
the category of unprotected speech outlined in
Ferber. Virtual child pornography, however, may
be a new category of unprotected speech brought
there is sexual conduct performed by two or more individuals. Child pornography is not under a similar restriction. In
contrast, the Supreme Court has held that a graphic focus of
a child's genitals is not protected speech. Osborne, 495 U.S. at

113.
116
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (noting that the various exceptions to the obscenity test do not apply in situations where a
child is sexually exploited).
198 F.3d 1083.
117
Id. at 1092; see also Ferber,458 U.S. at 763.
118
119 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762-63.
RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA
120
AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST
§ 2.09 (1994) [hereinafter SMOLLA & NIMAMENDMENT

(describing several key theories on the First Amendment). Among these theories are the heightened scrutiny,
the ad hoc balancing approach and absolutism). With the exception of absolutism, all of these theories allow for certain
types of speech to be proscribed. Under absolutism the government can never restrict an individual's right to free
speech. Id. at § 2.10.
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about by technological advances in the late 20"'
century. Determining whether virtual child pornography is a new category of unprotected speech
requires an examination of its value and harm to
society. As will be shown, the evils that virtual pornography perpetuates in society outweigh its low
social value, placing it outside the First Amendment.
III.

VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AS
LOW-VALUE SPEECH

Any debate about the First Amendment begins
with a discussion about what the Framers of the
Constitution intended to protect.120 The Supreme

Court has held that government cannot prohibit
speech simply because it does not agree with the
idea behind the speech.1 21 On the other hand,
the Supreme Court has held that speech may be,
proscribed if it is directed at inciting illegal conduct, 122 is libelous 123 or obscene.1 24 One of the

most popular theories describing the First
Amendment's purpose is the marketplace theory.
John Milton eloquently stated the heart of this
theory when he wrote, "[T] hough all the winds of
doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so
Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let
her and Falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth
put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?" 125 Proponents of this theory 26 argue that
freedom of speech is necessary because only in an
unfettered marketplace of ideas can truth ulti2
mately be discovered.1

7

See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416-18
Texas law forbidding the burning of the flag
(holding
(1989)
.was unconstitutional); see also Terminello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (holding a function of speech is to invite
dispute). See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2-3 (1998) (briefly discussing the Supreme Court's desire to protect free speech regardless of the unpleasantness
surrounding the message that the speech purports).
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 487 (stating that a govern122
ment can punish speech if it is directed at inciting an imminent serious harm and that result is likely to occur).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (holding that states could enact
123
laws to protect private individuals from libel).
Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (refusing to grant obscenity First
124
Amendment protection).
SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 120, at § 2.15.
125
Oliver Wendell HolmesJohn Milton andJohn Stuart
126
Mills are all supporters of this theory. Id.
See generally C. Thomas Dienes, Wen the First Amend127
ment is not Preferred: The Militay and Other "Special Contexts," 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 786-89 (1988) (utilizing Robert S.
121
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efits society not necessarily because absolute truth
is realized but because its greatest asset is its ability to provide the best test of truth.' 30 Melville
Nimmer and Rodney Smolla in their treatise on
the First Amendment stated that a better way to
view marketplace theory is "not as a guarantor of
the final conquest of truth, but rather as a defense

ment, the idea behind virtual child pornography
should be unprotected as well.
In Free Speech Coalition, the Ninth Circuit held
that absent some nexus showing that computergenerated images cause the same harm to children as real child pornography, the fact that virtual child pornography lacks social value is not
1 35
enough to label it as unprotected speech.
There are, however, two significant problems with
the Ninth Circuit's analysis. First, the Supreme
Court has recognized in past decisions that
speech with little social value can be denied First
Amendment protection. I6 For example, because
obscenity lacked social value, it was not necessary
to protect it to ensure that truth could be recog-

of the process of an open marketplace."' 3' Essen-

nized in the marketplace of ideas. 13

tially, marketplace theory operates not to ensure
that only one viewpoint survives, but that the process has shown that only one viewpoint has value.
When applying the theory to virtual child pornography, it becomes clear that virtual child pornography is not necessary to reach any ultimate
truth. First, child pornography has little value according to the Supreme Court in Ferber.'3 2 Just as
pictures depicting the sexual conduct of actual
children lack any social value, virtual child pornography also has little or no value. Simply because the children depicted in virtual child pornography are entirely fictitious does not increase
the idea's value to society.' 3 3 Virtual child pornography is not necessary for the "exposition of

preme Court labeled obscenity as unprotected
speech, certainly virtual child pornography
(which, unlike obscenity, has the possibility of
harming children) 3" also should be considered
unprotected speech. Second, as this comment will
discuss later, there is a nexus between the harm
caused by using real children and the harm
caused by images of computer-generated children. Therefore, even under the more relaxed
standard applied by the Ninth Circuit in Free
Speech Coalition, virtual child pornography also
does not qualify for First Amendment protection.
Just as virtual child pornography's lack of social
value can be compared to the social value of actual child pornography, the governmental interests in banning virtual child pornography mimic
the interests laid out by the Supreme Court in Ferber and Osborne.

Justice Holmes, a supporter of marketplace theory, did not believe in absolute truth.12 8 Rather,

Holmes recognized that if the speech
"threaten[ed] immediate interference with the
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an
immediate check is required to save the country,"
such speech may be constrained by government.

29

In other words, marketplace theory ben-

ideas." 1 3 4 Thus, if the idea behind real child por-

nography-the sexual exploitation of childrenis not afforded any protection by the First Amend-

Marx's remarks to explain the philosophical underpinnings
of marketplace theory).
128
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L.
REv. 40, 40 (1918).
129
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
130 SMOLLA & NiMMER, supra note 120, at § 2:19.
131

Id.

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1100 (Ferguson, J.,
133
dissenting).
134
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
135
Free Speech Coalition, 198 F,3d at 1094.
132

136

This, in essence, is the underlying philosophy behind

the categorical approach to the First Amendment and mar-

ketplace theory. Although marketplace theory does not explicitly state what "categories" of speech should be denied
protection, its application results in the exclusion of certain
categories of speech from the First Amendment. See, e.g.,

7

If the Su-

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (upholding a law prohibiting
speech that may cause a breach of the peace); Miller, 413 U.S.
at 23 (reaffirming that obscenity is not protected by the First
Amendment); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (holding that libelous
material may be regulated); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
563-66 (recognizing that the state may restrict the commer-

cial speech that is misleading and false). Whereas marketplace theory and the categorical approach rest on the
speech's value, both approaches reject the idea that the government can regulate speech simply because the majority rejects the idea behind the speech. It is not the idea behind the
speech that allows government to regulate it, but instead, the

low value the speech possesses. Ferber,458 U.S. at 754 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).
137 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484; see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
138

Even opponents of the CPPA have recognized the po-

tential for harm. Burke, supra note 18, at 461; see also, Friel,
supra note 18, at 229.
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VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND
ITS HARM TO SOCIETY

IV.

There is no question that virtual child pornography, which relies on computer-generated
images, is different from real child pornography
because no child is harmed in the production of
virtual child pornography. This distinction, how-

ever, does not change the argument that virtual
child pornography is not protected under the
First Amendment. Although the regulation of virtual child pornography encompasses a handful of
compelling governmental interests, 139 among the
most compelling are its ability to be utilized to seduce children and to hinder the law enforcement
140
of child pornography.
A.

Seduction Argument

to participate in sexual conduct may be persuaded to do so upon seeing a picture of another
child engaged in the same activity.' 45 If adults

cannot decipher the difference between actual
and computer-generated children, a young child
in a vulnerable situation also will not be able to
make the distinction. 146 The result is that while
virtual child pornography may not harm a child
when it is created, it still may lead to the sexual
abuse of children.
Several opponents have criticized Congress' argument that virtual child pornography leads to seduction as too speculative. 147 Brenda M. Simon
compares this seduction argument 148 to the asser-

tion that pornography causes men to rape women. 149 Further, she suggests that using this rationale punishes pedophiles before they commit a
crime.15 0 In other words, banning virtual child

Congress found, 141 and many scholars and
courts have agreed, that technology has made
computer-generated images "virtually indistinguishable" from images of real people.1 42 This
finding, coupled with the fact that child pornography is used to seduce children into performing
illegal sexual acts, 14 3 leads to the conclusion that
virtual child pornography also can be used to seduce children.' 44 A young child who is reluctant

pornography "punish[es] thought rather than action." 15 1 Her comparison to rape is flawed for two
reasons. First, the rape analogy does not rest on
the same premise as the contention that child
pornography is used to seduce children. Second,
her arguments ignore the Supreme Court's finding in Osborne that child pornography is used to

S. REP. No. 104-358, at 2. Specifically, Congress
found: (1) computer-generated images depicting an identifiable minor intrudes on the child's privacy and reputational
interests; (2) computer-generated images whet the sexual appetites of pedophile and child molesters; and (3) virtual
child pornography also can be used to seduce a child unable
to distinguish the real from the imaginary.
140
Id. at 2, 20.
141
Id. at 2.
142
Id.
143
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 (finding that pedophiles use
child pornography to seduce reluctant children); see also
Wendy L. Pursel, Comment, Computer-Generated Child Pornography: A Legal Alternative?, 22 SEATrLE UNIV. L. REv. 643, 661
(1998) (commenting that other authors are incorrect and
that a real material danger may ensue, including inducing
children to engage in sexual acts).
144 S. REP. No 104-358, at 2.
145 See also, Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111 n.7 (citing A-rr'v
GEN.'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supranote 11, at 649).
Dr. Shirley O'Brien described the seduction process in the
following steps summarized in the Senate's Report:
(1) [C]hild pornographic material is shown to a child
for 'educational purposes'; (2) an attempt is made to
convince a child that explicit sex is acceptable, even desirable; (3) the child is convinced that other children
are sexually active and that such conduct is okay; (4)
child pornography desensitizes the child, lowering the
child's inhibitions; (5) some of these sessions progress to
sexual activity involving the child; (6) photographs or

films are taken of sexual activity; and (7) this new child

139

seduce children.

52

Analyzing the effects that pornography has on

pornographic material is used to attract and seduce yet
more child victims.
S. REP. No. 104-358, at 14.
146
See generally Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996).
147
E.g., Simon, supra note 18, at 394; see also, Friel, supra
note 18, at 228.
148
The secondary effects argument is essentially the
same as the seduction argument. The main gist is that no
child is affected directly in the production but that children
are hurt indirectly.
149
Simon, supra note 18, at 394. Simon also mentions
that no current statute bans the use of adult pornography for
that reason. See infra text accompanying note 153.
15o Simon, supra note 18, at 395. In fact, Simon suggests
only punishing those who actually commit the crime. Id. The
thought of waiting until a child molester actual hurts a child,
however, is problematic and contrary to Supreme Court rulings. Ferber denied child pornography protection largely because of the harm it causes the victim. Essentially, a state's
ability to regulate child pornography stems from the belief
that a state's interest in protecting children is so great that
the legislature should be able to employ preventive measures.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64.
151
Simon, supra note 18, at 395.
152
Simon's rape analogy does not address the use of
child pornography to seduce children. She does not assert
that pornography is used by men to seduce unconsenting wo-
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the perpetrators of both rape and child molestation, in an effort to give computer-generated pornography First Amendment protection, is illogical. The activity depicted in pictures of nude
adults engaging in sexual activity is not illegal; pictures of children engaging in sexual acts represents illegal conduct a child can never knowingly
consent to perform.
Moreover, adult pornography is not used to seduce unwilling adults into performing sexual acts
in the same way that child pornography is used to
seduce children. Pornography may increase an
adult's sexual desire and therefore increase their
likelihood of fulfilling those desires with a certain
individual. That, however, is vastly different from
a child molester enticing a child into performing
illegal sexual acts. In the latter instance, child molesters can use the computer-generated material
to convince the child that other children have fun
when engaged in what is illegal sexual conduct.
The difference is that an adult has the mental
awareness to say no, whereas a child lacks the abil-

this possibility as a reality in child pornography
cases.
Finally, the connection between computer-generated images and pictures of actual children performing illegal sexual acts has been attacked by
some critics on the grounds that society should be
15
conscious of the fact that the camera can lie.'
The chief problem with this theory is that it forces
children to accept facts that even the adult population has not realized. While it is noble to suggest
that adults in today's society must learn to accept
that technology has destroyed the meaning behind the phrase "the camera does not lie," 159 the
fact remains that a child may not be able to distinguish images presented as real or computer generated. This is especially true when considering
that this child most likely will not have entered
puberty"!" and is possibly in a situation where a
trusted adult may attempt to molest him or her.

ity to consent.

The scales tip further in favor of denying virtual
child pornography First Amendment protection
because to hold otherwise would frustrate the
proper enforcement of laws that prohibit the possession of child pornography. It would be difficult
for police officers to distinguish between child
pornography that involves actual children and
that which is computer generated and involves no

B.

Law Enforcement

1 53

The argument that it is too speculative to assert
that virtual child pornography will be used to seduce children also fails because the Supreme
Court already has recognized that possibility as a
valid reason to outlaw child pornography. In Osborne, the Court took considered evidence that
showed child pornography may be used to seduce
children and relied on this finding as a reason to
outlaw the possession of child pornography. 15 4
Therefore, the argument that Congress cannot
regulate speech based on speculation fails, partly
because the Supreme Court, 15 5 the Congress' 5 6
and the Justice Department 15 7 all have recognized
men to engage in sexual conduct. Child pornography, however, is used by child molesters to seduce children. S. REP.
No. 104-358 at 2.
153 See generally Simon, supra note 18, at 394 (stressing

that adult pornography can also be used to seduce children);
cf, Lydia W. Lee, Note, Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996: Confronting the Challenges of Virtual Reality, 8 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 639, 656-57 (1999) (examining a study by Reuben Lang and Roy Frenzel, which showed that 6-15% of the
pedophiles they studied used adult pornography to seduce
children (citing Rueben A. Lang & Roy R. Frenzel, How Sex
Offenders Lure Children, 1 ANNALS SEx RES. 303, 309 (1988))).
Lee relied on this study as support for the proposition that
virtual child pornography can be used to seduce children.
She justified the small percentage by stating that in terms of
the number of children molested by pedophiles in the study,
that percentage represented the sexual abuse of five to eight

children.161 Although it may seem drastic to elimi-

nate virtual child pornography completely in order to help law enforcement, the harm experienced by the child victim of sexual molestation
dwarfs the slight value of the material. Congress
has stated that "[t]he Government's inability to
children. See Lee, this note, at 657.
154
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
155
Id. One author differentiates Osborne because he
finds virtual child pornography to be unprotected speech. See
Geating, supra note 18, at 400. This argument does not apply
when attempting to define virtual child pornography as a
new category of unprotected speech because the correct
analysis is to balance the harm the speech has on society with
its value.
156
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
157
A-rr'y GEN.'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra
note 11, at 649.
158
Friel, supra note 18, at 236-37.
159

Id.

160

See S. REP. No. 104-358, at Parts [V.A, C.

16'

S. R'I,. No. 104-358, at 16.
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detect or prove the use of real children in the pro-

fuse to recognize the connection between. virtual

could have the

child pornography and child molestation. 166 As

effect of increasing the sexually abusive and exploitive use of children to produce child pornography." 162 In other words, the true reason for denying virtual child pornography First Amendment
protection is not to help the government convict
pedophiles, but to help police stop pedophiles
before they harm young children.
The First Circuit in Hilton found that where individuals can create an image that looks like a real
child, the same technology can make a picture of
a real child appear computer generated.1 63 Thus,
if virtual child pornography is considered protected speech, prosecutors would be faced with a
dilemma in prosecuting people who possess child
pornography: they might not be able to prove that
the image depicts an actual child. This inability to
distinguish real children from computer-generated children would create a reasonable doubt as
to the origin of the picture. Individuals might escape not only conviction but also arrest because
law enforcement would not know whether the
images are of real or computer-generated children.
One critic argues that there should be a rebuttable presumption that the image depicts an actual child. 164 Although there are several problems
with this proposal, 65 the most important may be
the failure of the proposal to recognize the harm
that virtual child pornography inflicts on children. Some opponents of denying First Amendment protection to virtual child pornography re-

this comment has demonstrated, there is a strong
link between virtual child pornography and the
sexual abuse of children.
Professor Debra Burke, an opponent of the
CPPA, recognizes the possibility that virtual child
pornography may cause harm to children.16 7 Nevertheless, Burke maintains that the Constitution
requires that the danger to children posed by vir-

Id. at 20.
Hilton, 167 F.3d at 73.
164
Friel, supra note 18, at 209 (shifting the burden to the
defendant to prove that the image did not involve an actual
minor); see S. REP. No. 104-358, at 17 (recognizing that some
critics believe that images that do not portray real children
should not be protected).

did not commit a crime. Lastly, as this comment will illustrate, this proposal ignores the harms caused by virtual child

duction of child pornography ...

162

163

In the criminal arena, it is always the government and
not the defendant who must prove the elements of the crime.
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 n. 31 (1975) (explain165

ing that generally the prosecution bears the burden of proof
unless aided by a presumption or a permissible inference).
However, with a rebuttable presumption that the image depicts an actual child, there is a possibility that the innocent
will be convicted because they cannot disprove the presumption. It is almost impossible to prove that the images are computer generated. Individuals will be arrested for possessing
child pornography even though the image does not depict
an actual child. Assuming these individuals actually can prove

the image was created on a computer, they still will be forced
to deal with the social stigma associated with pedophilia. In
essence, the individuals will be punished even though they

tual child pornography be imminent.

6

This ar-

gument is disturbing, especially because Burke
herself admits virtual child pornography may not
only provoke pedophiles to molest children but
also validate and aid their actions.' 69 Under her
argument, children would continue to fall victim
to sexual molestation and the government would
be unable to stop the abuse because pedophiles
did not act promptly after viewing virtual child
pornography.
Moreover, Burke's argument also fails because,
as the First Circuit stated in Hilton, the Supreme
Court has given the government considerable leeway in dealing with child pornography because of
the severe effects that it has on the nation's children.1

70

In light of the need to protect the na-

tion's children from sexual abuse, law enforcement cannot afford to guess whether an image
seized as evidence is real or computer generated.
Law enforcement must be given the power to arrest individuals who possess child pornography
whether or not the images they possess are real or
computer generated. Because the government

pornography.

166
Eg., Simon, supra note 18, at 394. But see, Friel, supra
note 18, at 228.
Burke, supra note 18, at 461.
167
168

Id.

Id. ("Virtual child pornography may encourage, promote, persuade, or influence pedophiles to engage in illegal
169

conduct with children, it may validate their illegal activity,
and it may assist in their illegal activity.").
Hilton, 167 F.3d at 70-73 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at
170
756). Although the courts have not defined the precise leeway afforded to a state, it is not necessary to know the precise
limits of a state's authority in order to rebut Burke's argument. Particularly, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the "leeway" granted to states encompasses the state's right to
prohibit the possession of child pornography because it may

be used to seduce children. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111. This
argument, as this comment maintains, can be extended to
include virtual child pornography, which also can be used to

seduce children.
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has flexibility in regulating child pornography
and because the value of such material is slight,
the need for effective law enforcement trumps the
right of an individual to possess virtual child pornography.
The ability for government to outlaw child pornography in order to assist law enforcement is not
a new concept. The Supreme Court endorsed this
notion in both Ferberand Osborne when it accepted
that Congress may proscribe certain activities with
the ultimate purpose of abolishing the production of and market for child pornography. In Ferber, the Court found that prohibiting the advertising and selling of child pornography was a
7
reasonable means for stopping its production.' '
Likewise, the Court in Osborne accepted that a
complete ban on the possession of child pornography is a necessary means to expel the market for
child pornography. 72 It would be almost impossible for government to address the problem of
child molestation simply by attempting to stop
only the production of child pornography that
uses real children.
When faced with the task of eliminating the sexual abuse of children in today's technology-driven
society, government must be given the ability to
outlaw virtual child pornography. Although virtual child pornography is different from the situations that the Court addressed in Ferber and Osborne, it is similar in the sense that one of the main
reasons for proscribing the advertising, selling
and possession of child pornography is to help
government reduce the problem of child molestation. Similarly, allowing government the ability to
freely regulate virtual child pornography should
decrease the number of children victimized by
sexual abuse.
Critics of the CPPA argues that allowing virtual
171

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761-62.

Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109-10 ("It is also surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess
and view the product, thereby decreasing demand."); see also
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761-62. The Ferber Court stated:
The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for and are thus an integral
part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation. 'It rarely has been suggested
that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.'
172

Ferber,458 U.S. at 761-62.
7-3

See Friel, supra note 18, at 225.
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child pornography will decrease the number of
sexually abused children because pedophiles will
use computer-generated images rather than
images of actual children. 173 Further, they argue
that those who produce child pornography only
for the money will refrain from abusing children
because they can use a computer to create pornographic images of children. 174 Both of these assertions fail for several reasons. First, neither argument is supported by studies showing the ability
to generate child pornography on a computer will
significantly reduce the number of children
abused in the production of child pornography or
that a pedophile actually will be satisfied if he
knows the image is not of a real child. Second,
these arguments fail to address the fact that law
enforcement must have the ability to eliminate
certain tools, such as virtual child pornography,
that could be used by child molesters to seduce a
child.'

75

Finally, the assertion that pedophiles

would begin to look at virtual child pornography
rather than pornography using real children is
based on the unfounded premise that all child
pornography portraying actual children could be
eliminated. 176 This assertion also incorrectly assumes that future child pornography will be entirely computer generated. Effective enforcement
of child pornography laws only can be accomplished if government has the ability to monitor
both the virtual and actual pornography.
V.

THE LIMITS OF VIRTUAL CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY AND THE CPPA'S
OVERBREADTH

Although virtual child pornography is not included in Ferber'sdefinition of child pornography,
applying the Ferber standards will help define the
174
Id. at 227 (noting that financially motivated child
pornographers will see virtual child pornography as a more
economical and legal alternative).
175 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756 ("States are entitled to
greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions
of children."); see also Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109-10 (recognizing that states need the ability to ban the possession of child
pornography in order to decrease demand and, in turn, production).
176
As the Court found in Ferber, one of the reasons to
prohibit the distribution of child pornography is to prevent a
child from going through life knowing that his or her image
is circulating among pedophiles. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10.
The Ferber Court further stated that the only means of stopping the sexual exploitation of children is to halt the distribution of child pornography. Id. at 759-60.
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limits of virtual child pornography as a category of
speech unprotected by the First Amendment. In
Ferber, the Court defined child pornography as
"works that visually depict sexual conduct by children."1 77 The term "conduct" included lewd exhibitions of a child's genitals as not protected by the
First Amendment. 178 This definition of child pornography can apply equally to virtual child pornography so long as "visually" is read as limiting
the type of medium used to display child pornography rather than the nature of the child depicted. In other words, the term "visually" only
should require that a picture be involved and
should not restrict the subject depicted in the picture only to an actual child.
The justification for limiting the category of unprotected speech to pictures addresses the concern among critics of the CPPA that drawings,
paintings and sculptures still should be protected
by the First Amendment. 179 Although these critics
would exempt all virtual child pornography-arguing that a computer-generated image is more
like a drawing or painting than a picture of a real
child-that argument is not persuasive when comparing the significant societal harm of virtual
child pornography to its nonexistent social
value. 180 Although a computer-generated image is
created from a vision in a person's mind just like a
drawing or painting, it is the reality of the image
that connects a virtual picture to a picture depicting a real child. It is this reality that makes virtual
child pornography more like real child pornography because it is "virtually indistinguishable" from
the real child pornography, which is already illegal. While a child can look at a painting or a drawing and conclude that the picture is not real, a
child cannot easily distinguish a computer-generated picture from reality. The result is that virtual
child pornography can be used just like pornographic images depicting real children to seduce
Id. at 764.
Id. at 765.
179 See Simon, supra note 18, at 400 (citing Ferber, 458
U.S. at 762-63); Friel, supra note 18, at 242 n.240.
180 See Simon, supra note 18, at 400; see also Friel, supra
note 18, at 242 (exemplifying the arguments criticizing the
CPPA).
181 See generally Acheson, 195 F.3d at 651 (holding "appears to be" language only applies to images virtually indistinguishable from the actual child pornography). See also S.
REP. No. 104-358 at 7.
S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7.
182
177
178

an unwilling child, thus removing virtual child
pornography from the First Amendment's scope.
Further, because the harm that virtual child
pornography inflicts depends upon its likeness to
actual child pornography, virtual child pornography can be classified as unprotected speech only if
it is virtually indistinguishable from actual child
pornography. The legislative history of the CPPA
illustrates that Congress intended to regulate only
computer-generated images that are "virtually indistinguishable" from pictures portraying real
children. 1" Congress' main concern when enacting the CPPA was that the effect of computer-generated child pornography would be the same as
pornographic material that depicts real children
because it is almost impossible to tell the difference between the two types of pictures. 8 2 Therefore, the only computer-generated child pornography images that should be outside the First
Amendment are those "virtually indistinguishable" from real child pornography.
In Hilton, the First Circuit recognized that if virtual child pornography possesses any literary, artistic, scientific or political value, it should retain
First Amendment protection. 18 3 The Supreme
Court in Ferber refused to exempt images with literary, artistic, scientific or political value from the
definition of child pornography because the value
of the image is immaterial to the child abused
during the production of actual child pornography. 8 4 Virtual child pornography, however, does
not pose the same threat because a real child is
not harmed during the production of the material. Further, the Supreme Court explicitly stated
that when there existed a reason to display a pornographic image of a child, the producers of that
image could use an adult who looked like a
child. 185 This logic suggests that virtual child pornography may be an acceptable means for individuals to produce child pornography for literary or
183
Hilton, 167 F.3d at 74. The First Circuit did not address any details with regard to an exception for material
with literary, artistic, political or scientific value. It simply
noted that in light of Ferber's suggestion that an individual
above the legal age could be used if necessary for literary or
artistic purposes, the "appears to be provision" of the CPPA
may unconstitutionally restrict speech. Id. Nevertheless, the
Court opined that the limited incidences in which the exception would apply did not require holding the CPPA unconstitutional. Id.
184
185

Ferber,458 U.S. at 761.
See id. at 763.
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artistic purposes. In light of Ferber's reasoning,
computer-generated images should not be seen as
unprotected speech if the images possess discernable literary, artistic, scientific or political value.
The appropriate scope of virtual child pornography that is outside the First Amendment's protection should include only images that visually
depict either a child engaged in sexual conduct
or a lewd exhibition of a child's genitals. Further,
this category of unprotected virtual child pornography should be limited to images that are virtually indistinguishable from actual child pornography. Finally, if the image does not involve a real
child, and if the image possesses some literary, artistic, scientific or political value, it should be protected by the First Amendment. In applying this
definition to the CPPA, it is clear that the CPPA
does not define virtual child pornography in a
manner consistent with this proposed definition.
This inconsistency in the CPPA presents
possible overbreadth problems. 18 6 The overbreadth
doctrine exists primarily to ensure that laws do
not chill free speech by stopping individuals from
exercising their First Amendment rights out of
fear of criminal prosecution. In Broadrick v.
87

Oklahoma,'

the Supreme Court held that the

overbreadth doctrine only should be used when
the alleged legislative overbreadth is "substan-
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infringes on protected activity, the solution is not
invalidation of the entire scheme." 192 A case-bycase analysis of any computer-generated image
that falls into one of the above categories should
be sufficient to cure that part of the statute's potential overbreadth. The Supreme Court's opinion in Ferber supports the case-by-case approach,
especially where the statute's "legitimate reach
1
dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications."

93

Finally, the CPPA's affirmative defense provides
for the possibility that its phrase "appears to be"
in its definition of child pornography may catch
some adult pornography in the statute's grasp. Although the defense does not address virtual
images of adults, it does provide a defense for
those individuals marketing adult pornography
that also depicts a person who does not look over
the age of eighteen, so long as the image is not
marketed as child pornography.

94

This allows

producers of adult pornography to continue to
produce and sell pictures of actual adults engaged
in sexual activity. The only burden imposed by the
CPPA is that the producers of adult pornography
should confirm an individual's age before any pictures are taken.

9 5

Checking someone's identifica-

tion is a small price to pay to protect the nation's
children from the harm posed by virtual child
pornography.

tial .. .in relation to the statute's plainly legiti-

mate sweep."' 8 8 This rule is "strong medicine"
and should be used "sparingly and only as a last
resort."'" If it is at all possible for a court to apply
a limiting construction to the statute, the statute
will not be held as overbroad."'11
Applying this standard, it is easy to view the
CPPA as constitutional. First, the legislative history clearly indicates Congress sought only to ban
computer-generated images that are virtually indistinguishable from actual child pornography. 1"11
Second, the main problem with the CPPA is that
it does not exempt images with literary, artistic,
scientific or political value. The First Circuit in
Hilton noted that "even if a statute at its margins

VI.

The proper place for virtual child pornography
on the continuum of sexually explicit material is
next to actual child pornography, which are both
outside First Amendment protection as impermissible speech. Virtual child pornography and actual child pornography are nearly identical in appearance, value and harm. The only difference
between these two types of pornography is that
one directly abuses children in its production and
the other indirectly harms children. In both cases,
however, children are harmed. The sexual harms
that virtual child pornography inflicts on children

Before beginning the overbreadth analysis, it is im-

188

portant to note briefly two parts of the CPPA's definition of

119

child pornography related to virtual images. The definition
includes (1) images created on a computer and (2) images
that generally appear to be of a minor. Both of these provisions encompass virtual child pornography. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 121, 110 Stat. 3009-27-28 (1996).
187 413 U.S. 601 (1973).

199
191
192
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CONCLUSION

Id. at 615.
Id. at 613.
See id.

S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7.
Hilton, 167 F.3d at 74 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 488 (1988)).
193 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773.
194 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c).
195 See id.
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far outweigh any alleged social value. For this reason, virtual child pornography should be categorized as unprotected speech outside the First
Amendment.
Because there are differences between virtual
and actual child pornography, virtual child pornography must be considered a new category of
unprotected speech for First Amendment purposes. This new category of unprotected speech
should be limited to pictures that visually depict
children engaging in sexual conduct or that portray a lewd exhibition of a child's genitals. Furthermore, this new category of unprotected
speech does not permit government to regulate

drawings or paintings of children, and it does not
permit government to proscribe computer-generated images of children that have literary, artistic,
scientific or political value. Although the CPPA
does not set out a definition of virtual child pornography similar to what is proposed here, it is a
valid attempt to regulate child pornography. The
Supreme Court has given the government flexibility to enact laws aimed at stopping the sexual
abuse of children. The CPPA is simply the next
logical step in eradicating the sexual abuse of children-conduct that is not contemplated as freedom of speech in the First Amendment.

